But the role of money in this game is nothing new. The English Football League, with professional players, dates back already to 1888 and since then the role of money seems not to have decreased (Dobson and Goddard, 1998) . The main income of the football industry results from merchandising, sponsoring, media contracts and receipts from matches (for an overview of football teams' finances, see the yearly reviews by Deloitte and Touche). Competition is enormous and that is one of the reasons why clubs have turned to the stock exchange (Mitchell and Stewart, 2007) . The emission of shares gives them money that can be used to improve their financial position (Cooper and McHattie, 1997) . Tottenham Hotspurs was in 1983 the first football club with a listing on the stock exchange. Since then, many clubs have followed. Good results during the matches may translate in financial rewards as success attracts media attention and the scope for sponsoring, etc. (Dobson and Goddard, 2001 ).
In efficient markets, market participants respond to new information or news that in some way or another might regard the firms they invest in. The investors response can have an impact on the valuation of the firm. Given the enormous and growing amounts of money that are involved in football, it seems a legitimate question to ask whether losing or winning a football match impacts on the market valuation of the football club. The stock market participants can interpret the result as information and integrate it in their revaluation of the firm. A market reaction can be induced by the expected imminent cash flow associated with new information. So far, little research has been done into the 1 With football, we mean the game by which two teams of 11 players try to kick a round ball in the goal of the other team. In the USA, this game is called soccer. 2 Source: UEFA direct 7.07 (www.uefa.com). 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Forrest et al., 2005; Palomino et al., 2005) .
Method and Data
We use the event study methodology to analyse the effect of the results in the football matches on the stock market return of the listed football team. This methodology can be used to analyse the price reaction of a share from a specific event. Brown and 3 Alternative approaches to assess performance are the econometric model (for example, see Koning, 2003) and data envelopment analysis (see Barros and Leach, 2006) . (1980, 1985) and Campbell et al. (1997) give a thorough overview of this methodology (see also Mills et al., 1996, and Mishra et al., 2007 is the price of firm j at the end of period t-1.
To arrive at the abnormal return, we first must establish expected or normal returns. This is the return that is to be expected when the event would not have occurred.
The difference between the actual and the normal return is the abnormal return. The estimation period is the period that precedes the event period, i.e. the period at or during which the event does occur. The estimation period is used to estimate the model's parameters. It must not overlap with the event period as this would imply that it includes returns that are affected by the event. As the football matches are our events and as the events occur on a very frequent basis, it is rather difficult to choose an estimation period that does not include events that may impact on the returns. We follow the approach suggested by Warner (1980, 1985) and Campbell et al. (1997) and use an estimation period of 250 trading days. This estimation period is used for each match.
We use the market model to arrive at normal returns (see Warner (1980, 1985) , Beaver (1981) , Dyckman et al. (1984) ). This model is defined as:
Where R mt is the return of the market index at day t. j ˆand j ˆa re estimated on the basis of the ordinary least squares of the returns during the estimation period. j ˆi s an 
The football matches are our events. Given that there are a large number of matches, it is not possible to arrive at an estimation period that does not include eventrelated returns of the football teams. Renneboog and Van Brabant (2000) nor the other studies mentioned above do account for this problem and follow the approach suggested by Warner (1980, 1985) . Brown and Hartzell (2001) deviate from the standard approach and use all return data to arrive at their estimation of the normal return. We follow Brown and Warner and apply the Brown and Hartzell (2001) approach of using the whole sample period as the estimation period as a robustness check.
We use an event period of 1 single day, namely the first trading day after the match took place. This is defined as 'day 0'. We assess the impact of the event (the result of the football match) for this event period only. We take this extremely short event period in order to avoid that event periods overlap, which could result in misinterpretations of the outcome of the analysis. Short event periods -like ours of one single day -are not uncommon. Dyckman et al. (1984) as well as Glascock et al. (1991) advise to look for such a short period in order to be able to focus on the direct and uncontaminated results of an event.
As to our data, we depart from the 42 teams in Appendix 1 and apply the following selection criteria: The matches must have a betting quotation.
The country where the teams play their matches has a reinvestment index that reflects the development of the stock market return of the domestic market. and not sector indices as the benchmark in line with the suggestion by Brown and Warner (1985) . We use the following indices as a benchmark for the market: for England the FTSE All-Share index, for Germany the Dow Jones Germany Index, for Italy the Dow Jones Italy Index, for the Netherlands the Amsterdam All-Share index and for
Portugal the Dow Jones Portugal Index. All indices are value weighted indices; they weight of the returns of a firm within the index is determined by the market value of the index (see Krueger and Johnson, 1991) . We require a stock market index for every country that has firms in our sample. This index is a reinvestment index, taking account of dividends and stock splits. MacKinlay (1997) shows that the event study methodology is robust to cross-sectional dependence and clustering. It is suitable for tackling the 4 Zuber et al. (2005) exactly go into this issue as they are particularly interested in the investor characteristics of the football fans. Therefore, they do include the zero-return dates.
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The design of the European competition differs significantly from that of the national competition. Football teams play only two or a few matches before it is clear whether or not they may proceed to the next round, whereas in the national competition the number of matches is much larger before it is clear who ends as the champion and who is allowed to join the European competition. Furthermore, in the European competition, the teams may earn a bonus from each won match. In this paper we strictly focus on investor behaviour with respect to football stocks in relation to match results. We use information from bookmakers to arrive at the expectation about the result (see Forrest et al., 2005; Palomino et al., 2005) . As such, we do not account for the 'home ground advantage' (Vergin and Sosik, 1999), but assume that this effect is incorporated in betting quotes. Falter and Pérignon (2000) argue that the main 'football variables' have only a tenuous explanatory power concerning the final outcome of a given match. Match results are derived from http://www.soccerbase.com. Betting quotes for national games are derived from http://football-data.co.uk and for European ones from TotoSelect B.V., the Netherlands.
As to robustness, we will look into the impact of excluding outliers, we account for nonnormality and we undertake an alternative approach to determine normal returns. Table 1 gives the average abnormal returns on the first trading day after the football match. It reveals that a victory results in a mildly positive but very significant response on the stock market (+0.36%). This suggests that the market value of listed football teams increases by 0.36% after a victory. Defeat is punished (-1.41%), whereas a draw also results in a significantly negative response (-1.10%). When we compare the average abnormal return after a victory and that of a defeat, we find that the difference is statistically significant at the 1%-confidence level.
Results
[ Insert Table 1 about here ] Table 2 gives the abnormal returns on the first trading day after a match in the national leagues and relate these returns to whether or not the result was as expected. It reveals that unexpected wins result in slightly smaller positive abnormal returns than expected wins (namely +0.23 and +0.39% respectively). The difference is not et al. (2005) . Surprisingly too is that unexpected losses result in a negative return that is smaller (in absolute terms) than the abnormal returns that accompany expected losses.
Again, we find that the stock market responds stronger to defeats in the national competition than to victories (-1.14 versus +0.38%). The asymmetry is statistically significant at the 1%-level. If there is a draw when victory was expected, we find a significantly negative abnormal return. If there is a draw when defeat was expected, the abnormal return is not significant.
[ Insert Table 2 about here ] Table 3 gives the abnormal returns for matches in the European competition. It reveals that an expected victory has no significant impact whereas an unexpected victory has. Expected defeats in European football matches earn a significantly negative abnormal return, suggesting that the stock market does not account for all available information (see also Palomino et al., 2005) . Unexpected defeats result in a significantly stronger negative reaction from the stock market. The difference between an unexpected victory in the national and an unexpected one in the European competition is not significant. However, we find that the difference between victories and defeats is significant at the 5%-level. We do not find a stronger response to expected than to unexpected results. As in the national leagues, we find that (un)expected defeats result in a stronger reaction than (un)expected victories. The stock market's reaction after a defeat in European matches is larger than that in national ones (-2.14% versus -1.14% for losses in national leagues). This may be related to the design of the European competition (see footnote 3). Table 3 also reveals that a draw where a victory was expected results in a significantly negative abnormal return. In contrast, when there is a draw when defeat was expected, this does not result in a significant abnormal return. Apart from a purely financial explanation we also may hold psychological factors responsible for our results:
There is both theoretical background and empirical evidence that people respond emotionally stronger after defeats than after victories (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;  F o r P e e r R e v i e w 8 White, 1989; Trovato, 1998; Reilly and Gilbourne, 2003; Pain and Harwood, 2004) . As this is not the particular subject of this study, we will not go further into this issue.
Robustness
As to the robustness of our findings, we look into the impact of excluding outliers, we account for nonnormality and we undertake an alternative approach to determine normal returns.
We find that the results are robust to outliers (robustness results are available upon request). Only in the case of games unexpectedly won at the national level and a draw in the national competition when defeat was expected do outliers impact on the conclusion.
The Student t-test and the Corrado rank test result in the same conclusions with respect to the statistical significance of our findings. Only for one type of matches they give different results: The average abnormal return after an unexpected victory is significant according to the Corrado test, not to the Student test. But when we exclude outliers they both point at significant abnormal returns. We are inclined to base our conclusions on the Corrado test as, with a limited number of observations, abnormal returns will depart more from the normal distribution than in the case of many observations (Brown and Warner, 1985) .
We also use an alternative estimation procedure to arrive at the expected returns, namely the one suggested by Brown and Hartzell (2001) . They take the full observation period to arrive at the normal returns. The results for the Brown and Hartzell approach are not reported here for brevity sake but are available upon request. We find that the Brown-Hartzell approach gives results that are fully in line with those reported in the text above. Therefore, we conclude that our findings are robust to the estimation procedure.
Conclusion
Money is key in football. Losing or winning a match impacts on the expected cash flows of the team and may affect its market value. In order to find out how investors 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r P e e r R e v i e w 9 respond to the results of football matches, we investigated whether results from 1247 national and European football matches lead to abnormal returns of the shares of eight listed football teams. We conclude that the stock market responds positive to victories and negative to defeats. Second is that the stock market responds asymmetrically, that is the response to defeat is 'stronger' than that to victory. This may be related to the idea that the public is more sensitive to losses. However, it also might result from asymmetric results and returns. Furthermore, the stock market reacts stronger to the results in European matches than to those in the national leagues. Fourth, unexpected results in European matches do result in a stronger stock market response than expected results, whereas this is not the case in the national competition. We assume that the third and fourth conclusion can be related to the much larger importance of financial incentives in the European competition. Our results are robust to outliers, to nonnormality in the returns and to the estimation procedure.
When we relate our results to previous research, our observations are in line with Brown and Hartzell (2001) as we also found that matches indeed directly impact on the stock return and that there is an asymmetric reaction with respect to won or lost matches.
Brown and Hartzell, however, do not find a significant effect of matches in the national competition whereas we do find such an effect. This may result from the type of competition analysed, namely basketball in the case of Brown and Hartzell and football in our study. In line with Renneboog and Vanbrabant (2000) and Palomino et al. (2005) , we find that victories are positively rewarded by the stock market, whereas defeat and draw are 'punished', i.e. earn negative returns. Also, we find that defeats result in higher (absolute) negative returns than victories. Furthermore, our results are in line with the analysis of Stadtmann (2003) , and generalize his findings to an international setting. Our results contrast those of Zuber et al. (2005) who did not find abnormal returns from football teams' results. This difference can be explained by the fact that Zuber et al.
include nonzero return days to focus on fan-behaviour, whereas we focus on investorbehaviour and exclude nonzeros. From this, we are inclined to conclude that football stock investors differ from football fans. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
